Terminology of the Free Will Debate
We have put together a short tutorial on the terminology of the free will debate. We hope that you find this helpful.
Causal determinism: Causal determinism is the thesis that every event is necessitated by earlier events in conjunction with the laws of nature.
Compatibilism: Compatibilism is the thesis that causal determinism is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. Compatibilism does not involve the acceptance or rejection of causal determinism. Rather, it concerns the relationship between (a) causal determinism and (b) free will and moral responsibility.
The idea here is that causal determinism does not preclude free will and moral responsibility: we can be free and morally responsible even if causal determinism is true. Compatibilists who accept causal determinism are soft determinists.
Incompatibilism: Incompatibilism also concerns the relationship between (a) causal determinism and (b) free will and moral responsibility. The incompatibilist believes that if causal determinism is true, then human beings are not free and morally responsible. On this view, causal determinism rules out (or is incompatible with) free will and moral responsibility. The incompatibilist accepts the following two claims:
(3) If causal determinism is true, then we are not free and morally responsible.
(4) If causal determinism is not true, then we may be free and morally responsible.
Incompatibilism, like compatibilism, does not involve the acceptance or rejection of causal determinism. A person who accepts both incompatibilism and causal determinism is a hard determinist. An incompatibilist who rejects causal determinism and believes that human beings are free is a libertarian.
It is important to note here that a person can accept incompatibilism and reject causal determinism without believing that human beings are free and morally responsible. The acceptance of incompatibilism and the rejection of causal determinism does not secure the truth of libertarianism. A person may believe that indeterminism, or the rejection of determinism, is insufficient for free will. The fact that the universe may involve a certain amount of chance does not explain how free will is actual or even possible. After all, if my thinking or deciding is based upon chance, then I would seem to lack an important form of control over myself necessary for free will. Free action is not just action that is uncaused or random; it is action that is controlled or guided by a person’s reasons or choices.
Hard determinism: Hard determinists accept both incompatibilism and causal determinism. They believe that causal determinism is true and incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. Hard determinists argue that agents lack control over their actions since they lack control over all of the events that necessitated (or led up to) their actions. For example, I may desire to live the passionate life of an artist. But given that I did not choose the genes and life experiences that created this desire in me, I am not in control of it (and am thus not free with respect to it). When we take a close look at the causal history of a particular action, we will see that we lack ultimate control over it.
Consider the following illustration of this:
Birth > I enjoy finger painting as a child. > I excel in art classes during high school. > I want to attend art school. > I decide to attend art school. > I attend art school.
Soft determinism: Soft determinists accept both compatibilism and causal determinism. They believe that human beings are (a) causally determined, and (b) free and morally responsible. After reading about hard determinism, many students of philosophy find soft determinism counterintuitive and difficult to grasp. How can we be free if all of our actions are necessitated by past events? There are several ways that a soft determinist might reply to this question. In the first place, a soft determinism might argue that the reasons that cause our actions do not limit our freedom; rather, they express our freedom. A reason does not interfere with my freedom so long as it is my reason. I act freely so long as I act voluntarily or on the basis of my own desires, reasons, or choices. A soft determinist may also respond by pointing to the relationship between causal determinism and morality. As David Hume famously argued, we can only hold a person responsible for her actions if we can trace them back to something permanent or semi-permanent in her, i.e., her character. The practices associated with morality are only possible if causal determinism or ‘necessity’ is true.
Libertarianism: Libertarians are incompatibilists who reject causal determinism. They believe that human beings cannot be free if they are causally determined. Libertarians and hard determinists are in agreement here: both reject the soft determinist’s understanding of freedom. On their view, an action is not free if it is caused by something over which an agent has no control. If an agent does not have ultimate control over what causes her to act (reasons, desires, etc.), then she is not free. For the libertarian, a free person must in some sense be self-made or self-caused. She must possess the God-like ability to cause things to happen without her actions being causally determined in turn. How can this be? One philosophical task for the libertarian is to explain how this is possible. The libertarian must also face the empirical challenge of finding space in the physical universe for this type of freedom and ‘agent causality’ to exist.
Source & Links
David Hume presents his famous arguments in support of soft determinism in An Enquiry Concerning Human Nature. [David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning Human Nature. Ed. Eric Steinberg. (Cambridge: Hacket Publishing, 1977), pp. 53-69.]
You can also find this work on Google Books.
For more information on the free will debate, check out the free will entry on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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